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LAWYERS, LINGUISTS, STORY-TELLERS, AND
LIMITED ENGLISH-SPEAKING WITNESSES
MIGUEL A. MlfNDEZ*
I. INTRODUCTION
Trials take place principally because the parties disagree about the contours of
an historical event. The parties may agree that a collision took place at a
particular intersection, but disagree about who ran the light. To win, the
prevailing party must convince the fact-finder to accept its version of the event
as presented by its witnesses and other evidence. Because witnesses are usually
asked to describe what they saw or heard, one would expect testimony to
resemble the kind of story-telling all of us engage in when describing to others
an event we have witnessed. The stories we tell each other are usually organized
chronologically, have a beginning and an end, and are interrupted only by the
listener's need for clarifying information or remarks expressing wonderment
("Really?") or disbelief ("I can't believe that.") or agreement with the narrator's
account ("I've seen that too."). Courtroom testimony, however, typically does not
resemble the stories we tell each other.'
Instead, evidentiary constraints and strategic and tactical concerns impose limits
on how events from the past can be recounted in the courtroom. The result on direct
examination is a fragmented account in which the witness is expected to respond
only to the examining attorney's questions. 2 Cross-examination poses even more
severe challenges to lay witnesses who simply want to relate their stories. 3 In
commonplace story-telling, listeners may or may not voice their disagreements with
the story-teller's account. In courtroom story-telling, however, the party opposing
the witness is expressly given the opportunity to discredit the story-teller's
account.4 These forays into the credibility of the witness aggravate the fragmented
structure of the account the witness attempts to relate on direct examination.
Moreover, the use of leading questions on cross-examination hampers any attempt
by the witness to retell her story in conventional terms.
The rules for taking testimony thus handicap witnesses in ways which are of
little or no concern to conventional story-tellers. The rules shift the story-teller's
concern with transmitting information to worries about whether the story-teller is

* Adelbert H. Sweet Professor of Law. Stanford University. Research for this Article was supported by
the Stanford Legal Research Fund, made possible by a bequest from Ira. S. Lillick and gifts from friends of
Stanford Law School. and the Stanford Center for Chicano Research. I am grateful for the comments of
colleagues who attended a faculty seminar in which I presented an early draft of this Article. I am especially
indebted to Professors George Fisher, who reviewed an early draft, and Guadalupe Vald6s, a Stanford University
linguist, whose pioneering work has paved the way for research into the difficulties faced by limited Englishspeaking witnesses. Her review of this Article was invaluable. A version of this Article was presented as part
of the Working Paper Series of the Stanford Center for Chicano Research.
1. See Guadalupe Valdes, Analyzing the Demands That CourtroomInteractionMakes Upon Speakers of
Ordinary English: Toward the Development of a Coherent Descriptive Framework, 9 DISCOURSE PROCESSES
269, 270 (1986).
2. See generally ia at 273.
3. See, e.g., FED. R. EV. 611(c); CAL. EVID. CODE § 767 (a)(2) (West 1995); N.M. R. EviD. 11-611(C)
(allowing the use of leading questions on cross-examination).
4. See Valdds, supra note 1, at 278.
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complying with the rules of the forum. The courtroom's rules thus threaten to
shift the focus from content to form. Witnesses are placed in the position of
trying to provide information others demand rather than information they would
ordinarily provide, and of attempting to defend themselves against challenges to
their credibility. It is no wonder then, that telling stories on the stand can be an
ordeal for many witnesses, rather than a civic duty.
The problems ordinary witnesses face are seemingly compounded when those
witnesses possess limited English skills.5 To the extent that the rules for taking
testimony force witnesses to respond to demands for information, witnesses with
limited English skills may encounter enormous difficulties in understanding what
is expected of them and in responding to those demands. To the extent that the
accurate transmittal of information sometimes requires witnesses to resist the
suggestions of the cross-examiner, limited English-speaking witnesses may find
it harder to hold their ground because of their limited verbal skills.
In addition, the adversarial model assumes that the rules governing witness
interrogations will provide the fact-finders with a fund of reliable information that
is essential to their accurate reconstruction of historical events.6
That
assumption, however, may be especially questionable in the case of limited
English-speaking witnesses who are compelled to testify in English. As a result,
the goal of accurate fact finding cannot be reached unless trial judges can
determine effectively and efficiently whether a limited English-speaking witness
is entitled to the assistance of an interpreter.
How serious is the problem of interpretation in American courts? Data on
America's changing demography suggest that the problem is profound and
worsening. A recent study of state courts estimated that in 1990 the number of
home speakers of non-English languages in the United States was nearly thirty-two
million, or about 13% of the United States population." Of the nearly thirty-two
million home speakers of non-English languages, over half (17.3 million) spoke
Spanish at home.' More than half of the Spanish home speakers (9.8 million)
resided in the border states of Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas.9

5. [EDS. NOTE: The question of the need for an interpreter in the courtroom setting is not confined to the
context of witnesses and litigants, but also extends to jurors. See Mike Folks, New Trial Denied After
InterpreterFlap, SUN SENTINEL, Oct. 27, 1996, at B3, available in WESTLAW, Allnews database, 1996 WL
10694307 (Judge denied a new trial after allowing a Spanish interpreter to assist a juror during a criminal trial
and during the jury deliberations. The juror had been seated and the trial commenced before his limited English
abilities became apparent to the judge and the attorneys. The trial judge indicated the issue was important
enough to be reviewed by the Fourth Circuit.).]
6. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. § 611(a) CAL EVID. CODE § 765(a) (West 1995); N.M. R. EVID. 11-611(A).
7. See Charles M. Grabau & Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Protecting the Rights of Linguistic Minorities:
Challenges to Court Interpretation,30 NEw ENG. L. REv. 227, 236 n.19 (1996); see also WMUAM E. HEwrT,
COURT INTERPRETATION: MODEL GUIDES FOR POUCY AND PRACTICE INTHE STATE COURTS 11 (1995). "Of
that number [thirty-two million], 43.9 percent speak English 'less than "very well."' Grabau & Gibbons, supra,
at 236-37 (quoting UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUs, NO. 57, STATISTCAL ABSTRACr OF THE UNrrED

STATES 53 (1994)).
8. See HEwrrT, supra note 7, at 11, 26. Of the approximately 17.3 million home speakers of Spanish,
approximately two-thirds speak some English (11.5 million). See Miguel A. Mindez, Hernandez: The Wrong
Message at the Wrong Time, 4 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 193, 198 (Winter 1992-1993).
9. See HEWir, supra note 7, at 26.
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The implications for court proceedings in California, New Mexico, and Texas
are especially serious. Home speakers of Spanish comprise 18% of California's0
population, 25% of New Mexico's population, and 20% of Texas' population.'
Because speakers of other languages who reside in these and other states also
speak some English, the potential number of limited English speakers who may
be called to give testimony in state and federal courts is high.
The purpose of this Article is to explore the need to provide trial judges with
an effective and efficient English assessment test that will help them determine
whether a limited English-speaking witness requires the help of an interpreter."
This Article is not about the rights of the accused to have an interpreter present
to translate the court proceedings, 2 nor is it about the adequacy of procedures
for determining the competency of interpreters.
Part II examines from a legal perspective the problems that courtroom storytelling generally poses to witnesses. Part I re-examines witness courtroom storytelling difficulties from a linguistic perspective. Part IV summarizes and assesses
the adequacy of judicial and legislative responses to the problems of limited
English-speaking witnesses. Part V describes the obstacles to the development
of an English language assessment instrument and to the use of interpreters. Part
V also describes some of the features which should be incorporated in an English
language assessment instrument. Part V then concludes with a call for linguists
and lawyers to work together to devise an effective and efficient English
assessment instrument for determining when a limited English-speaking witness
should be allowed to testify through an interpreter.
H. A LAWYER'S VIEW OF COURTROOM STORY-TELLING
Evidentiary Constraints
Evidentiary concerns impose limits on how events from the past can be
described in the courtroom. The general rule in American courts is that witnesses
may speak only in response to questions.' 3
A.

1. Direct Examination
The effects of the rules on testimony elicited on direct examination can be
traced to a single rule: in the absence of compelling circumstances, witnesses

10. See id
11. A recent United States Supreme Court case has added a new urgency to the need for providing trialjudges
with an effective and efficient test to determine whether a limited English-speaking witness should testify through
an interpreter. In Hernandez v. New York, the Court held that prosecutors can use their peremptory challenges to

eliminate bilingual venire persons who they "feel" cannot abide by the official interpretation of the testimony of
non-English-speaking witnesses. See 500 U.S. 352, 361-63 (1991). Because a party may decide that it is more
advant-ageous to have jurors of the same ethnic background as the limited English-speaking witness, especially
when the witness is a party, Hernandez may encourage some parties to persuade limited English-speaking witnesses
to forego the use of an interpreter and, instead, testify in English to avoid the striking of bilingual venire persons
by the oppos-ing party. The risk in such a trade-off is the loss of the testimony the party and/or witness might
otherwise provide through an interpreter.
12. See discussion infra Part IV.A.l. (differentiating between a witness interpreter and a proceedings

interpreter).
13. See generally FED. R. EVID. 611 advisory committee's note; CAL. EVID. CODE § 766 (West 1995); N.M.
R. EvID. 11-611.
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may not relate their testimony in the form of a narrative. 4 Thus, to tell their
stories, witnesses must refrain from telling their stories. The result on direct
examination is a fragmented account in which the witness is expected to respond
only to the examining attorney's questions." Answers that do not respond to
the examiner's questions may be stricken upon motion by the examining party as
"unresponsive." 36 Responsive answers, even when considered as a whole, are
unlikely to resemble the story which the witness would have related in another
less formal setting-her living room, for example. The answers, moreover, will
contain much information which the witness would not have provided, but which
the examining lawyer considers important.' 7
The limitation on direct examination testimony is justified by the need to
diminish the risk that witnesses will relate matters which the rules of evidence
deem inadmissible for a variety of reasons."8 Only by forcing the witness to
answer specific questions posed by the direct examiner will the opposing lawyer
have an opportunity to raise objections before the witness answers. 9 Simply
asking witnesses to relate all they know about a specific event defeats this
goal.2°
2.

Cross-Examination

Cross-examination poses even more severe challenges than direct examination
to lay notions of how witnesses should relate their stories. In commonplace
story-telling, the listeners may or may not voice their disagreements with the
story-teller's account. Common rules of courtesy discourage listeners from
interrupting or discrediting the story-teller. In courtroom story-telling, however,
the party opposing the witness is expressly given permission to discredit the story-

teller's account. 21 The cross-examiner, for example, may challenge the witness's

perceptual powers-"You weren't wearing your glasses, were you?"-or
veracity-"Just last year, you were convicted of perjury, were you not?".

14. See MIGUEL A. Mt.NDEZ, CALiFORNA EVIDENCE § 1.04, at 10 (1993).
15. See generally id Leading questions generally are inappropriate on direct examination. See id § 1.04,
at 9 (citing FED. R. EVID. 611(c); CAL. EViD. CODE § 767(a)(1) (West 1995)); see also N.M. R. EVID. 11-

611(C).
16. See M]NDEZ, supra note 14, § 1.04, at 12-13. In California, unresponsive answers must be stricken on
the motion of any party, not just the examining party. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 766 (West 1995); see also
MANDEZ, supra note 14, § 1.04, at 12-13.
17. An example of information which would be considered irrelevant to a traditional story-teller, but would
be considered highly relevant to an attorney, is information about the lighting conditions prevailing at the time
of the witness's observations.
18.

See MtNDEZ, supra note 14, § 1.04, at 10.

19. See generally id
20. See id In some instances, opposing counsel will forego making narrative objections because jurors may
empathize with witnesses whose attempts to tell their stories are unreasonably interrupted by the opposing
lawyer's objections. Furthermore, jurors may resent defense objections when the story-teller is a sympathetic
victim-a rape victim, for example.
21. See id; see also FED. R. EviD. 611(c); CAL. EvID. CODE § 767(aX2) (west 1995); N.M. R. EVID. § 11611(C) (allowing use of leading questions on cross-examination). See generally FED. R. EVID. 611(b); CAL.
EVID. CODE § 767(a)(2) (West 1995); N.M. R. EvID. § 11-61 1(B) (allowing cross-examination of matters that
were the subject of direct examination and on matters of witness credibility).
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A good cross-examiner, moreover, utilizes a form of examination that is alien to
story-telling. When we tell a story, we get to tell the story. We select the words and
phrases that convey the desired information. But, as demonstrated by the above two
examples, cross-examiners use questions that are designed to limit the witness to
"yes" or "no" answers. The last thing a cross-examiner wants is for the witness to
repeat any damaging answers the witness may have given on direct examination.'
That risk is diminished by asking the witness "leading questions" on crossexamination. The rules of evidence assume that leading questions are among the
most effective means for exposing flaws in perception, recollection, narration, and
sincerity.' Modem codes of evidence expressly allow the use of such questions
on cross-examination.'
3. Other Non-Conventional Story-Telling Courtroom Practices
Other aspects of courtroom practice distinguish testimony from conventional
story-telling. When we tell stories in our own homes, no one stands between us and
the listeners. The listeners know their cognitive needs and may ask clarifying
questions if they wish. In the courtroom, however, the attorneys comprise a special
class of listeners. As a rule, only they get to ask questions, including follow-up
Jurors are usually passive players.26 Their cognitive needs, if
questions.'
addressed at all, must be anticipated by the lawyers.27
The restraints on testimony, moreover, make witnesses a special class of storytellers. As a result of pretrial preparation, witnesses know that they are not free to
relate their recollection of the events in question with the same freedom enjoyed by
conventional story-tellers. Witnesses also know that whatever they say on direct
examination can be challenged on cross-examination and under circumstances far
removed from those connected with living room conversations. 28 And, unlike
conventional story-tellers, witnesses can be subjected to perjury prosecutions for
knowingly making false statements under oath.29
Strategicand Tactical Concerns
The rules of evidence are not the only force shaping courtroom story-telling.
Strategic concerns of lawyers play an equally important role. Preparing witnesses
to tell a convincing story that complies with the rules of evidence will be of no avail
B.

22. See MtNDEz, supra note 14, § 1.04, at 10. See generally FED. R. EvID. 611(b); CAL. EVID. CODE §

773(a) (West 1995); N.M. R. EVID. 11-611(B).
23. See generally FED. R. EvID. 611(c); CAL. EVID. CODE § 767(a)(2) (West 1995); N.M. R. EVID. 11611(C).
24. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 611(c); CAL. EVID. CODE § 767(a)(2) (West 1995); N.M. R. EVID. 11-611(C).
Leading questions also may be asked on the direct examination of hostile witnesses. See FED. R. EVID. 611 (c)
cmt.; CAL. EVID. CODE § 767(a)(2) (West 1995); N.M. R. EvID. 11-611(C).
25. Judges, of course, also may address questions to witnesses. See FED. R. EviD. 614; CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 775 (West 1995); N.M. R. EvID. 11-614; see also MtNDEZ, supra note 14, § 17.11, at 348 n.1. Jurors rarely
get this opportunity, although a large number of jurisdictions now commit the asking of questions by jurors to
the judge's discretion. See M9NDEz, supra note 14, § 17.11. at 348.
26. See MNDE7, supra note 14, § 17.11, at 348.
27. See id.
28. See FED. R. EVID. 611(b); CAL. EVID. CODE § 773(a) (West 1995); N.M. R. EVID. 11-611(B).
29. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-25-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1994).
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if lawyers fail to get their case-in-chief to the jury. Unless lawyers produce some
evidence of each element of their claims or affirmative defenses, their cases,
generally, will be nonsuited at the conclusion of their case-in-chief.30
This harsh reality forces lawyers to approach litigation along two simultaneous
tracks. The first, less obvious, track is technical in nature. The lawyers must make
sure that they have presented some evidence of each element of their case's claim
or defense by the conclusion of their case-in-chief.3' That is the subject of
procedure. The second, more obvious track, requires lawyers to plan their
presentation of the evidence in the fashion most likely to be accepted by the factfinder(s)-making sure, for example, that a lawyer's witnesses tell a credible story
in response to the lawyer's questions on direct examination. That is the subject of
trial advocacy.
Though procedural and advocacy goals are not necessarily inconsistent,
complying with the procedural requirements may require eliciting information from
witnesses which they would not ordinarily provide when retelling their stories in
their homes. In criminal cases, for example, prosecutors will elicit from some
witnesses information about where the offense took place. The fact that an offense
took place in Palo Alto, and that Palo Alto is in Santa Clara County, and that Santa
Clara County is in the State of California, could hardly matter to a jury hearing a
murder case where the killing occurred in Palo Alto. But the procedural rules
require the prosecution to establish the Santa Clara County Superior Court's
jurisdiction to hear the case.
Tactical concerns can play an even greater role than technical ones in shaping
courtroom story-telling. Tactical considerations include an assessment of the
credibility of the witnesses to be called by each side.
Trial lawyers know that the outcome of a trial will be determined in [most]
cases by which witnesses the juro[rs] choose[] to believe and which [ones they]
decide[] to ignore. Telling jurors which witnesses to believe or disbelieve is
thus a crucial part of a closing argument. But such an appeal will not be [wellreceived by the jurors] unless the lawyer can give [them] reasons rooted in the
evidence about why a witness['s testimony should be accepted or rejected]. This
inescapable dynamic of jury trials encourages lawyers to produce the most
favorable evidence about the credibility of their witnesses and the most
unfavorable about their opponents'. 32
In theory, lawyers develop their witness lists and the order and structure of their
witness examinations with one goal in mind-presenting the information in the form

30. Plaintiffs in civil cases and prosecutors in criminal cases who fail to make out a prima facie case can
be nonsuited at the conclusion of their case-in-chief. See generallyCHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 94, at 463-64 (3d ed. 1976); ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM, 3 TRIAL MANUAL 5 FOR

THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES § 385, at 155 (5th ed. 1989). However, in criminal cases, prosecutors are
precluded from moving for a directed verdict by the United States Constitution's Sixth Amendment right to trial
by jury. See WRIGHT, supra, § 94, at 463 n.5. Nonetheless, criminal defendants who fail to produce evidence
of an affirmative defense (e.g., self-defense) or who fail to contest an element of the offense (e.g., non-formation
of the requisite mens rea because of intoxication), are still subject to a penalty. In the absence of any evidence
supporting a criminal defendant's legal theory, a criminal defendant's counsel may not argue that theory to the
jurors and the judge cannot instruct the jurors on it. See MjtNDEZ, supra note 14, § 17.10, at 346.
31. See FED. R. Civ. P. 50.
32. Mg
.oEz,
supra note 14, § 15.01, at 260.
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most likely to be accepted by the fact-finder(s).33 In an ideal world, a lawyer would
lead with a strong witness, one who can grab the jurors' attention, and end with an
equally strong one, a witness who could tug the jurors' hearts hard enough so that
their minds, in the form of a favorable verdict, would follow. This goal may well
require the lawyer to abandon a convention that shapes most story-telling,
developing the story chronologically. Instead, a lawyer might otherwise begin with
an ending and end with what might be considered a beginning of a narrative.
Irrespective of the steps lawyers take to support the credibility of their witnesses
on direct examination (or to attack the credibility of the opposing party's witnesses
on cross-examination), one thing is clear-the telling of the whole story will be
affected in ways that do not intrude in everyday story-telling. The production as a
whole may not resemble a chronicle, as in traditional story-telling; themes, rather
than discrete events occurring over time, may be the dominant features. 4
Individual witnesses may not be given opportunities to share their narratives, and
even the stories they do get to tell may be disrupted with side-trips bearing on their
credibility.
In sum, the rules for taking testimony handicap witnesses in ways which are of
little or no concern to conventional story-tellers. Rules of evidence and trial tactics
shift the story-teller's concern from transmitting important information to worries
about whether the story-teller is complying with the rules of the forum.
III. A LINGUIST'S VIEW OF COURTROOM STORY-TELLING
Linguists have long been intrigued by the use of language in the courtroom.35
Some have focused on how the use of courtroom English poses special difficulties
for jurors.36 Others have explored how a witness's choice of words affects
jurors.37 Still others have examined why courtroom speech seems to be governed
by rules which do not operate the same way in "normal," non-courtroom conversation.a" "In analyzing [courtroom speech], most [linguists] have identified question'
and-answer sequences [of witness interrogations] as the basic units of analysis." 39
But as of 1986, only a minority of linguists have recognized that the rules of
evidence "might well influence the function, organization, and selection of questions
asked." O
A.

Summary of Valds' Linguistic Model
Linguist Guadalupe Valdts has explored the demands which both evidence rules
and advocacy (or "contextual") considerations make on English-speaking 4

33. See STEVEN LUBET, MoDERN TRIA. ADvocAcy: ANALYSIs AND PRoCEDuRE 11 (1993).
34. A good direct examiner can help witnesses overcome their resistance to presenting testimony
thematically instead of chronologically. Experienced trial lawyers spend considerable time preparing important
witnesses to give desired answers on cue.
35. See Vald6s, supra note 1, at 270.
36. See id (citations omitted).
37. See id at 270, 277 (citations omitted).
38. See id (citations omitted).
39. Id at 271. See discussion supra Part I.
40. Vald6s, supra note 1. at 271.
41. Valdds defines "English speakers" as those who are "fluent speakers of ordinary English." Id at 271.
Valds further states that "[tihis terminology includes all speakers of English, including bilingual speakers, who
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witnesses.4 2 Vald6s' work sheds significant light on the demands which the
formalities and dynamics attending a trial place on witnesses.4 3 Like most other
linguists, Vald6s sees the examination of a witness as consisting of question-andunrelated
answer sequences." But rather than viewing these sequences as discrete,
46
exchanges, 45 she places them in a "macro" and a "micro" context.
Taking a cue from what trial lawyers actually do, Vald6s assumes that competent
trial lawyers call each witness as part of an overall strategy designed to win the
case. 47 Important to Vald6s is that each witness examination sequence is designed
to elicit some evidence that is necessary to avoid a nonsuit, to enhance or undermine
the credibility of the witnesses, to support the giving of favorable jury instructions,
and/or to provide an evidentiary basis for the factual assertions required of a
persuasive closing argument.' Thus, Vald6s' approach "for analyzing direct and
cross-examination sequences focuses.., on the intendedfunction of each utterance
within the structure of the examination encounter," 49 rather than "on the form of
specific questions and answers."50
B.

Application of Valds' Model

1. Direct Examination
Vald~s perceives each paired question-and-answer sequence on direct examination as an attempt by the lawyer to get the witness to provide information the
lawyer considers significant.5 " In Vald~s' model, a direct examination can be

claim to interact in this language on a daily basis, and who consider themselves to be 'normal' speakers of

American English." hId
42. See id at 271. Valdds states that her framework "focus[es on] ... the 'ordinary' [English-speaking]
lay person as he or she presents testimony on the witness stand ...[and] seeks to describe direct and cross" Id
examination sequences ....
43. See id As Valdes states:
Mhe development of (my] framework is ...an important first step in examining courtroom

interaction, not as a series of questions and answers, but as sequential and interrelated discourse.
More importantly, it provides a means for studying the extent to which ordinary individuals are
able to protect their own interests within the legal domain using ordinary conversational skills.
Id at 294-95.
44. See id at 271.
45. Vald6s' analytical framework "makes it possible for a student of courtroom behavior to identify each
original question and all succeeding restated questions and their answers as one interrelated unit." Id at 294.
46. See id at 270-71.
[T]his paper will concern itself with presenting a descriptive framework which includes: (a)

a macrostructural description of direct and cross-examination sequences as contexts that
condition interaction between ordinary speakers and attorneys; and (b) a microanalytical
model which can account for the strategic success or failure of the coherent series of moves
carried out during examination sequences in a question-and-answer format.
ld
47. See idat 272-73.
48. See idat 273.
49. Id. at 277 (emphases added).
50. Id
51. See id at 278.

[Q]uestions addressed to witnesses [on direct examination] are interpreted by them not as true
requests for information, but rather as first parts of an exchange in which they are to "perform"
as cued. The attorney and the witness are... a "performance team," that is a set of individuals
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analyzed as a series of exchanges, each of which consists of two moves-the
"initiate" and the "terminate."52 Because the "initiate is a request for a display
53
of information," it is a move that can only be made by the examining lawyer.
The terminate, on the other hand, is a move that can only be made by the witness,
because it should produce the outcome requested by the examiner.' Thus, a
lawyer's question asking a witness to describe his occupation would be an initiate
and the witness's answer would be the terminate. An exchange ends when the
witness produces a terminate that satisfies the lawyer. 55 If the lawyer is satisfied
with the witness's response, the lawyer will introduce a new topic through another
initiate.56 If the lawyer is dissatisfied with the answer, the lawyer may follow it
by a series of reinitiates or abort the exchange if it appears that the witness cannot
or will not provide the desired answer.57
Vald6s' linguistic description of direct examination fits a trial lawyer's intuitive
sense of the purpose of the examination "to establish for the jury a particular view
of the events in question."" Vald6s, however, makes explicit the cooperative
nature of most direct examinations.5 9 Witnesses who have been properly
prepared to testify should feel that they are indeed the other half of the lawyer's
performance team and should provide the lawyer only with the information the
lawyer desires and only when the lawyer calls for it. These witnesses should
suppress their inclination to engage in commonplace story-telling and, instead,
should tell their stories only in the form and sequence the lawyer desires.
2. Cross-Examination
Vald~s' linguistic insights into the nature of cross-examination are even more
incisive.'
She recognizes that the role of the cross-examiner is to "shake"
or "discredit" the account the witness gave on direct examination.6 1 Although

who cooperate in staging a single routine .... As a member of a team, a witness can be considered successful if he or she provides preferred [responses] to the attorney's requests for
information ....
The attorney, on the other hand, is the team's director. The attorney can be considered
successful if able to sustain his or her particular definition of the situation by effectively cuing
the performance of the witness.
Id

52. See id at 281.
53. See id

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See id at 280, 281.
See id at 280, 281-82.
See generally id at 280-81.
See id at 283.
1d at 278.
See id

60. See id

61. See id at 278-79. Valdas explains:
The objectives of both witnesses and attorneys are different in cross-examination encounters.
Witnesses involved in this type of examination hear questions addressed to them by the
opposing attorneys as challenges ....
In a cross-examination encounter, the attorney seeks to cast doubts on the interpretation of
the line taken by his or her opponent. The attorney challenges the statements made by
witnesses for the other "side" in order to (a) discredit the testimony previously given or (b)
bring out facts which favor his or her own case.
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she does not expressly analyze cross-examination in terms of the goals commonly
accepted by trial lawyers, her ability to analyze cross-examination as a series of
discrete exchanges designed to discredit a witness provides important clues into
62
the linguistic demands that this examination makes on witnesses.
Although they might use different terms, trial lawyers would not likely disagree
with Vald6s' analysis. The role of the cross-examiner is to get the witness to
recant her direct examination testimony or, failing that, to impeach the witness by
exposing flaws in the witness's perceptual, recollective, and/or narrative abilities
(including the witness's sincerity). Regardless of the terminology chosen, Vald~s
63
is correct in her description of the dynamics attending cross-examination. No
one, especially the witness, can doubt that the witness is the prey and the
examiner the hunter. To linguists such as Vald6s, confrontation distinguishes
cross-examination from the kind of discourse ordinarily encountered in nonThe confrontational features of cross-examination also
courtroom settings.'
underscore the importance of resistance by witnesses to a cross-examiner's
suggestions when the witnesses disagree with assertions in the examiner's
questions.'
Because language is the medium of exchange in the courtroom encounter,
Vald~s' model allows researchers to study the extent to which witnesses can
protect their interests in the legal domain using their ordinary conversational
By devising a framework for examining each paired question-andskills.'
answer sequence in a trial advocacy context, Vald6s has provided researchers with
the means to explore the demands which witness interrogation places upon
ordinary speakers.6'
Limited English-Speaking Witnesses
Vald6s' model focuses on English-speaking witnesses because, from a linguistic
and scientific perspective, studies on how well English-speaking witnesses can
hold their ground when testifying in a courtroom should precede the examination
of problems encountered by limited English-speaking witnesses. 68 Pragmatically,
C.

62. See id
The witness ... is in one of two positions: (a) either actually involved in the case [as a
party]; or (b) simply serving as witness due to force of circumstances. In the first case,
during cross-examination, the personally involved witness has a vested interest in maintaining
the line taken by his or her attorney. In the second case, the uninvolved witness will, at the
very least, have an interest in maintaining his or her own face. A challenge, then, issued
during cross-examination is heard as either a request for an admission or a request for a
defense. In this context, therefore, witnesses can be considered successful if they are able to
defend or support their asserted proposition(s) either directly or indirectly.
63. Tools given to the cross-examiner--the right to use leading questions, to strike unresponsive answers,
to ask the judge to instruct the witness to answer only the questions asked, and to insist on answers under oath
in the presence of the fact-finder(s)-accentuate the adversarial nature of cross-examination.

64. See id. at 294.
65. See id at 292.
66. See id at 293-94.
67. See id. at 284.
68. See id at 294-95. Linguistically, it is important to know whether the problems facing limited Englishspeaking witnesses are peculiar to these types of witnesses or are simply the general type of problems all
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however, the increased use of limited English-speaking witnesses69 demands an
assessment of the adequacy of current measures used to determine whether limited
English-speaking witnesses are entitled to the assistance of an interpreter.
Language, after all, furnishes the weapons used by lawyers and witnesses in a
confrontational encounter.
The hypothesis that the discomforts facing witnesses are magnified when the
witness possesses limited English skills is not unreasonable. To the extent that the
rules for taking testimony force witnesses to respond to demands for information,
witnesses with limited English-speaking skills can be expected to encounter
greater difficulties in understanding what is demanded of them and in responding
to those demands. These difficulties are compounded on cross-examination,
where the verbal ability of witnesses to hold their ground is put to the test."' As
Vald6s points out, whether or not the cross-examiner succeeds in achieving her
goals will depend in part on a witness's ability to discern the examiner's strategy
and to take defensive measures.71 A good witness defense, thus, requires both
sophisticated linguistic and strategic skills. Because a witness's ability to use
words are her principal defensive weapons, it seems likely that limited Englishspeaking witnesses would be at a distinct disadvantage in the examination
battle.7 2
Witnesses, however, are not entitled to use interpreters just because they say
they need them. Judges make this determination.73 Whether an interpreter
should be appointed is left to judicial discretion.7 4 What standards do judges
employ when a witness claims some limited English-speaking ability? Are these
standards linguistically sound? An extrapolation of Vald6s' model for the
problems faced by English-speaking witnesses to limited English-speaking
witnesses is useful in assessing the adequacy of current responses.
IV. THE JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES
TO THE NEED FOR WITNESS INTERPRETERS
A.

The Common Law Approach
Prior to the adoption of statutes calling for the appointment of interpreters,
judges looked to judicially-created rules in determining whether a litigant or
witness was entitled to an interpreter. Most of these common law rules had a
witnesses face. See id at 270. Thus, the general problems surrounding witness testimony must be understood
before specific problems of limited English-speaking witness can be analyzed. See id at 295.
69. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
70. While non-English-speaking witnesses may not face these difficulties, they must rely on the interpreter's
skills to convey both the demand and the response accurately.

71. See Valds, supra note 1. at 279, 292.
72. Cross-examiners do not necessarily relish the opportunity to examine a limited English-speaking witness
who is not assisted by an interpreter. The goal of the cross-examiner is to induce the witness to provide certain
answers. That may be more difficult when the witness does not readily grasp what is demanded of him or her,
requiring the lawyer to rephrase the question, or when the witness uses his or her limited English-speaking skills
to avoid answering the question. In either case, the momentum which the lawyer hopes to establish through a
set of particular question-and-answer sequences will be more difficult to achieve.
73. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 604,706; CAL. EvID. CODE
11-706; see also infra Part IV.B.

74. See discussion infra Part IV.A.

§§ 730,750

(West 1995); N.M. R. EViD. 11-604,
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constitutional basis." Appellate claims7 6 involving the issue of interpretation
appear in one of three settings: (1) the right to an interpreter in pre-trial
77
proceedings, such as hearings for accepting pleas in criminal cases; (2) the
right of criminal defendants to an interpreter so as to understand trial proceedings
and assist counsel;78 and (3) the right of a witness, including criminal
defendants, to an interpreter while testifying.79 The three settings correspond to
two of three recognized interpretive functions-proceedings interpreting and
witness interpreting.'
1. Proceedings Interpretation and Witness Interpretation
The goal of proceedings interpretation is to enable a non-English-speaking
litigant to participate in the proceedings in the same manner as would an Englishspeaking litigant."' It is achieved by providing the litigant with an interpreter
2
who can translate the court proceedings into the litigant's language. The
interpretive function is performed in a simultaneous mode-the interpreter renders
3
The
the spoken proceedings word-for-word into the litigant's language.
record."
court
interpreter's rendition, however, is not part of the official
In contrast, witness interpretation is for the benefit of all of the courtroom
players, not just the non-English-speaking (or limited English-speaking)
witness.8 5 The purpose is to give the parties, the court, and the jurors access to
the witness's testimony.86 The interpretive function is performed in a
consecutive mode. 7 The principal role of the interpreter is to render questions
posed to the witness into the witness's language and to render the witness's

75. The Fifth and Sixth Amendments protect the right to confrontation and to effective counsel. U.S. CONST.
amend. V, VI. For a list of possible constitutional violations when a witness is denied an interpreter, see
Califomia v. Carreon, 198 Cal. Rptr. 843, 847 (Ct. App. 1984).
76. Appellate claims have arisen under the United States Constitution and under statutory law. Hence, this
section applies equally to both types of claims.
77. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. United States, 33 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 1994).
78. See, e.g., United States v. Torres, 47 F.3d 1172, 1995 WL 5616, at *12 (6th Cir. 1995) (unpublished
disposition). But see Jara v. Municipal Court, 578 P.2d 94,96 (Cal. 1978) (in bank) (holding that a non-Englishspeaking civil litigant is not entitled to have an interpreter appointed at state expense).
79. See, e.g., United States v. Carrion, 488 F.2d 12, 14 (1st Cir. 1973).
80. See HEWIr, supra note 7, at 34. The third function-interview interpreting-is beyond the scope of
this Article.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 32, 34. Simultaneous interpretation is defined as
rendering an interpretation continuously at the same time someone is speaking. Simultaneous
interpreting is intended to be heard only by the person receiving the interpretation and is
usually accomplished by speaking in whispered tones or using equipment specially designed
for the purpose in order to be as unobtrusive as possible.
Id. at 32.
84. See id. at 34.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See id. at 32, 34. Consecutive interpreting is defined as "rendering statements made in a source language
[e.g., Spanish] into statements in the target language [e.g., English] intermittently after a pause between each
completed statement in the source language. In other words, the interpreter renders an interpretation after the
speaker has stopped speaking." I& at 32.
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answers into English.88 Unlike the interpreter's rendition of the proceedings for
the litigant, the interpreter's rendition of the witness's responses is part of the
official court record."' Jurors are expected to rely on the interpreter's rendition
in reaching their verdict,
even if jurors who know the witness's language disagree
90
with the rendition.
Much of the appellate litigation drawing on common law principles concerns
proceedings interpretation. A party who cannot understand English can neither
appreciate the nature of the proceedings nor assist counsel in presenting a case.
Such a party is as removed from the proceedings as is the criminal defendant who
has been found incompetent to stand trial. As has been judicially acknowledged,
"trying a [criminal] defendant in a language he does not understand has a Kafkalike quality"9 that is especially egregious during the cross-examination of the
state's witnesses.'
"Mere confrontation of the witnesses would be useless,
bordering U on the farcical, if the accused could not hear or understand their
testimony.
Although the focus of this Article is on witness interpretation, past judicial
responses to claims involving proceedings interpretations provide some insights
into judicial treatment of witness interpretation claims. As we shall see below,
appellate courts have failed to distinguish proceedings interpretations from witness
interpretations and have employed the same test to assess both a trial court's
ruling to withhold a proceedings interpreter and a trial court's ruling to withhold
a witness interpreter. 94
2. The "Abuse of Discretion" Standard
Although a ruling on either a proceedings or witness interpreter request requires
the trial judge to assess the litigant's or witness's command of English, the
assessment measures the judge employs must necessarily be different. In
assessing the linguistic competency of a litigant, a judge should determine
principally whether the litigant's understanding of English would embrace the
kind of language expected in the course of the trial, especially during the
examination of witnesses. 95
Appellate judges are aware that the right to a proceedings interpreter is less
certain where "the defendant has some ability to understand and communicate [in
English], but clearly has some difficulty."' 9 They recognize that "the [trial
judge's] determination is likely to hinge upon various factors, including the

88. See i
89. See id at 34.
90. See id at 131, 132; see also Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360-61 n.3, 362 (1991); Mdndez,
supra note 8, at 194-95. There is no constitutional impediment to eliminating potential bilingual jurors who fail
to satisfy the trial judge that they will abide by the official translation. See Hernandez,500 U.S. at 362-63; see
also Mindez, supra note 8, at 198.

91. United States v. Desist, 384 F.2d 889, 902 (2d Cir. 1967).
92. See United States v. Carrion, 488 F.2d 12, 14 (1st Cir. 1973).
93. Terry v. State, 105 So. 386, 387 (Ala. CL App. 1925) (defendant was "deaf and mute"; Alabama
Constitution provides an accused the right to be heard).
94. See discussion infra Part IV.A.2.
95. See generally Valdds, supra note 1, at 269-71.
96. Carrion,488 F.2d at 14.
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complexity of the issues and testimony presented during trial . ..."' But rather
than articulate tests for guiding the trial judge in making the linguistic
competency decision, appellate courts instead have committed the decision carte
blanche to the trial judge's discretion:
It would be a fruitless and frustrating exercise for the appellate court to have
to infer language difficulty from every faltering, repetitious bit of testimony
in the record. But precisely because the trial court is entrusted with
discretion, it should make unmistakably clear to a defendant who may have
a language difficulty that he has a right to a court-appointed interpreter if the
court determines that one is needed, and, whenever put on notice that there
may be some significant language difficulty, the court should make such a
determination of need."
Undoubtedly, appellate review of rulings withholding a proceedings interpreter
is less onerous if appellants have to convince the appellate court that the trial
judge abused her or his discretion." Only in the most egregious cases would
the appealing party prevail and then only if the erroneous ruling resulted in
prejudicial error. But rules that may make life easier for appellate judges do not
necessarily ease the burdens facing trial judges. Simply committing the
appointment of proceedings interpreters to the discretion of trial judges hardly
provides trial judges with the guidelines they should employ in determining
whether a limited English-speaking litigant is entitled to an interpreter.
Appellate judges also recognize that withholding a witness interpreter from a
limited English-speaking witness can result in the introduction of mistaken
information that can infect the verdict. As in the case of proceedings interpreters,
appellate judges have been especially sensitive to the interests of criminal
defendants. "If the defendant takes the stand in his own behalf, but has an
imperfect command of English, there exists the additional danger that he will
either misunderstand crucial questions or that the jury will misconstrue crucial
responses."'" The result from the defendant's perspective is the same as when
a proceedings interpreter is erroneously withheld: "[T]he Kafkaesque spectre of
an incomprehensible ritual which may terminate in punishment."' 0 But despite
the potential for such an undesirable outcome, the response of the appellate courts
to claims of erroneous withholding of witness interpreters has been the same as

97. Id (citation omitted).
98. Id at 15.
99. The "clear error" standard is usually the standard of abuse of discretion used by an appellate court to
review a district court's interpreter appointment decision. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. United States, 33 F.3d 1047,
1050-51 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[We review the cold record for clear error only. .. [.1"); United States v. Mayans,
17 F.3d 1174, 1179, 1180 (9th Cir. 1994) ("mhe use of interpreters in the courtroom is a matter within the trial
court's [wide] discretion, and... a trial court's ruling on such a matter will be reversed only for clear error.");
United States v. Sanchez, 928 F.2d 1450, 1455 (6th Cir. 1991) ("As long as the purposes of the [Court
Interpreters] Act[, 28 U.S.C. § 1827 (Supp. 1990)], have been met, the appropriate use of interpreters in the
courtroom is a matter within the sound discretion of the district court"); Valladares v. United States, 871 F.2d
1564, 1566 (11th Cir. 1989) ("he use of an interpreter under [the Court Interpreters Act] is committed to the
sound discretion of the trial judge."). For a discussion of the traditional common law "clearly erroneous"
standard of abuse of discretion, see generally FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a); WRIGHT, supra note 30, § 96, at 479-81.
100. Carrion, 488 F.2d at 14.
101. Id
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in the case of erroneous withholding of proceedings interpreters-limiting
appellate review to an assessment of whether the trial judge's ruling amounted to
an abuse of discretion.'°2
Furthermore, a determination that a litigant does not need a proceedings
interpreter does not necessarily mean that the litigant, as a witness, is not entitled
to an interpreter. Admittedly, evidence that a party needs an interpreter in order
to understand the proceedings is probative of that party's need for an interpreter
in the event he or she takes the stand. But being able to understand court
proceedings, including the testimony of adverse witnesses, does not necessarily
mean that a party, as a witness, would be able to defend his or her ground on
cross-examination in the sense described by Vald~s °3 Comprehending the
testimony of witnesses does not require the same linguistic skills as defending
oneself on cross-examination." °4
Defending oneself requires bo%w an
understanding of what is demanded and the verbal ability to give or withhold
what is demanded.
Only when the test for assessing the need for a proceedings interpreter also
assesses the need for a witness interpreter may courts dispense with the necessity
of employing two different tests. But, inferring from Vald6s' research, a single
English assessment instrument is not possible."1°
Different assessment
measures, not a single one, are required. Crucial as this distinction is, the
appellate approach to witness interpretation has not promoted research in this area.
Instead, by measuring trial judges' rulings withholding proceedings or witness
interpreters by the same deferential standard, appellate judges have clouded, rather
than illuminated, the different needs of limited English-speaking witnesses and
litigants.
3. The Example of Gonzalez v. United States
Gonzalez v. United States,1°6 an interpreter proceedings case, further
illustrates the limitations of the common law's abuse of discretion standard
approach. Miguel Angel Gonzalez sought to overturn his convictions for drug
offenses on the ground that the district courtjudge failed to appoint an interpreter
for him at the time he pleaded guilty.'
Gonzalez claimed that his limited
English-speaking ability prevented him from understanding the nature of the
charges against him and the potential consequences of a guilty plea."t
Two of the three appellate judges hearing the Gonzalez case concluded that the
district court judge did not abuse his discretion in finding that Gonzalez's
language difficulties did not present a "major" problem." 9 They emphasized
that at the time the plea was taken the district court judge "knew that Gonzalez

102. See, e.g., id. at 14-15, and the cases cited therein.
103. See HEwrr, supra note 7, at 125-26; see also discussion supra Part Im.B.2.
104. See supra Parts lI.B and IU.C.

105. See generally Vald~s, supranote 1, at 281, 286 (different demands are made of witnesses during direct
examination and cross-examination).
106. 33 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 1994).
107. See id.at 1048, 1050.
108. See idt at 1048.
109. See id at 1050-51.
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had lived in Oregon for ten years, was buying his own home, and worked in the
auto and truck sales business."' 1" In addition, the two judges paid particular
attention to the following colloquy which took place between the district court
judge and Gonzalez at the change of plea hearing:
What did you do? Did you work with other people to buy
Court:
drugs and sell them?
Gonzalez: I used the telephone.
Court:

In addition to using the phone, what did you do?

Gonzalez: I worked with Forcelledo.
Did you sell drugs to people?
Court:
Gonzalez: Yes.
Court:

Was that drug cocaine?

Gonzalez: Yes.
Court:

Where did you get the drugs you sold?

Linstedt [Gonzalez's lawyer]: You worked for Forcelledo?
Gonzalez: Right.
Court:

Did you ever sell cocaine to somebody?

Gonzalez: Yes.
Court:

Where did you get that cocaine?

Gonzalez: Get [sic] it from Forcelledo."
The two affirming judges also focused on the district court judge's
observations:
The record should reflect that [Gonzalez] has been in court when other
defendants have entered a plea of guilty and that he has been assisted by
competent counsel who has fully advised him of his rights and that he has
also been assisted also [sic] by his wife who is able to assist the attorney in
explaining these matters to him." 2
However, looking at the same colloquy, the dissenting judge found that
Gonzalez was capable of responding to the judge's questions only when they
required "yes" or "no" answers."' Other parts of the colloquy not considered
110. Id at 1050. While Gonzalez had lived in Oregon for ten years. he had lived in the United States for
a total of twenty years. See id.
111. Id Gonzalez's lawyer also stated that he believed that Gonzalez's plea was an "understanding plea."
See id

112. Id at 1050-51.
113. See id. at 1053 n.3 (Reinhardt. J., dissenting).
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by the majority led the dissenting judge to conclude that "whenever the district
court asked a question requiring a slightly more complicated answer, Gonzalez's
answers were non-responsive, even when coached by his lawyer.""1 4 The
dissenting judge cited the following examples:
District Judge:

Would you tell me what your understanding
of Count 1 of the indictment is; that is, the
conspiracy charge? What do you think they
are charging you with by alleging you
participated in the conspiracy?

Gonzalez's Lawyer:

He is asking you on the conspiracy what does
that mean. [sic] What are you charged with?
What did you do?

Gonzalez:

With the telephone call?

District Judge:

What did you do? Did you work with other
people to buy drugs and sell them?

Gonzalez:

I used the telephone.115

The dissenting judge was not impressed by the fact that Gonzalez's wife may
have assisted him in understanding the proceedings. "The district court had no
evidence that Gonzalez's wife was an accurate or impartial interpreter [as required
by the federal Court Interpreters Act'16 and noted by the accompanying House
of Representatives Report]; 1 to the contrary, the fact that she was a
codefendant in the case render[ed] her involvement highly questionable.' 1.
A linguist would be astonished by the Ninth Circuit's explanations. To a
linguist the issues would be quite different. The question would not be whether
the trial judge abused his discretion in making the linguistic call. Rather, it would
be whether a linguistically defensible call could be made on the basis of the
information available to the judge. A linguist would be interested primarily in
assessing Gonzalez's linguistic competency in English and then in determining
whether, given his competency level, he would most likely understand what
would be demanded of him at a change of plea hearing. 9 In assessing
Gonzalez's English proficiency, a linguist decidedly would not ask the type of
leading questions used at times by the district court judge.1 2 Instead, a linguist,
like dissenting Judge Reinhardt in Gonzalez, would take the use of leading

114. Id. (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 1053-54 n.3 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
116. 28 U.S.C. § 1827 (1994). The Court Interpreters Act (Act) mandates the provision of qualified and
impartial interpreters to criminal defendants who are language impaired. See id; see also Gonzalez, 33 F.3d at
1054 (Reinhardt J., dissenting).
117. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1687, at 5 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4652, 4656.
118. Gonzalez, 33 F.3d at 1054 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
119. See Interview with Guadalupe Valdis, Professor at Stanford University, in Stanford, Cal. (Aug., 1996).
120. See id
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questions into account in determining whether the trial judge made a linguistically
sound determination in light of the available information.'
B.

The Statutory Response
Congress and some state legislatures have responded to the dramatic increase
in recent years of the non-English-speaking population 22 by enacting statutes
providing for court interpreters. 2 ' Courts have increasingly relied on these
enactments in assessing claims of error grounded on a trial judge's failure to
appoint an interpreter. 4 However, both the federal and state measures have
inadequately addressed the problem faced by limited English-speaking witnesses
and litigants.
1. The Federal Court Interpreters Act of 1978 and Attendant Case Law
Linguists consider the federal Court Interpreters Act of 1978' 5 (Act) a
milestone.' 26 The Act was the first comprehensive federal effort to assure the
availability of competent interpreters in federal court proceedings. 27 The Act
requires the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts to
prescribe and certify the qualifications of interpreters in the federal courts.12
The Act further requires federal judges to use certified interpreters if the judge
determines that a party or a witness who may present testimony speaks only or
primarily a language other than English "so as to inhibit such party's comprehension of the proceedings or communication with counsel or the presiding
judicial officer, or so as to inhibit such witness's comprehension of questions and
the presentation of testimony."' 29
Unfortunately, as illustrated by the language quoted above, nothing in the Act
purports to guide the trial judge in determining whether a particular party or
witness should be aided by an interpreter. Indeed, the legislative history
completely bypasses the question of how the judge is to make the competency
determination and entrusts the task, without guidelines, to the judge and counsel:
While the judge has the ultimate responsibility in determining whether or not an
interpreter is required under this legislation, it is anticipated that counsel will
alert the judge's attention to the fact that an interpreter may be needed. It is
anticipated that the need for formal proceedings to make an initial determination
of whether the appointment of an interpreter is required will be minimal.
Instead, we anticipate that during discovery or other pretrial matters counsel for
both parties will be able to assess the language capability of a party.'3°

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

See id.
See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
See infra Parts IV.B.I and IV.B.2.
See infra Parts IV.B.1 and IV.B.2.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1827-1828 (1994).

126. See ROSEANN DUERAs GoNZALEZ ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF COURT INTERPRETATION 57 (1991).

127. See iL at 55.
128. See 28 U.S.C. § 1827(b)(1) (1994). Not all federal court proceedings are subject to the Act. The Act
applies only to federal criminal actions and those civil actions initiated by the United States in the federal district

courts. See id § 1828(a).
129. d § 1827(d)(1).
130. H.R. REP. No. 95-1687, at 6 (1978). reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4652, 4657.
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In addition, the House of Representatives' Report accompanying the Act
focuses exclusively on a party's need for a proceedings interpreter. 13 ' A
witness's need for an interpreter on direct or cross-examination is not
mentioned. 132 Members of Congress, like appellate judges, have failed to
appreciate that responding to questions requires different linguistic skills than does
understanding court proceedings.
The cases interpreting the Act have not remedied the Act's deficiencies-there
has been no judicial development under the Act of any guidelines to help judges
in making the linguistic call. The circuit courts that have considered claims that
trial judges erroneously withheld interpreters under the Act have in each instance
held that the question on review was whether the judge abused his33 or her
discretion, and thus, have applied the traditional common law standard.
2. State Legislation and Constitutional Provisions
Most states have no legislation regulating the use of court interpreters.
States that have spoken on the subject have established36the right to37use an
3
interpreter as a constitutional right, as a statutory right,' or as both.
State legislation establishing a statutory right falls into two categories. In the
first instance, the statutes merely establish the right to use a witness
interpreter. 38 In the second instance, the legislation resembles the federal
Act'39 by requiring the use of witness or proceedings interpreters who meet
prescribed qualifications."4° However, even the second type of statutes, which
establish a comprehensive scheme for identifying and certifying qualified
interpreters, fail to prescribe the kinds of measures trial judges should employ in
determining whether to provide a proceedings or witness interpreter to a limited
English-speaking witness.' 41 Thus, the state enactments, whether creating
131. See id at 3, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4653 (stating that the impetus for the Act was court decisions
requiring non-English-speaking defendants to be informed of their right to a proceedings interpreter).
132. See generally id at 3, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4652-66.
133. See Gonzalez v. United States, 33 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 1994); supra Part IV.A.3 (discussing
Gonzalez); see also United States v. Mayans, 17 F.3d 1174, 1179 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Sanchez, 928
F.2d 1450, 1455 (6th Cir. 1991); Valladares v. United States, 871 F.2d 1564, 1566 (11th Cir. 1989). For a
discussion of traditional common law standard of abuse of discretion, see supra Part IV.A.2.
134. A recent study on the use of interpreters in state courts cites only California, New Jersey, Washington,
and Massachusetts for accomplishments in setting standards, developing test and certification programs, and
implementing training programs for interpreters, judges, and other justice system personnel. See HEWrrr, supra
note 7, at 13. New Mexico also has set standards for the use of interpreters in courtroom proceedings, has
mandated the identification or provision of certified interpreter training and certification programs, and has
established a "court interpreters advisory committee." See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-10-3 to 38-10-8 (Repl. Pamp.
1987); see also LR5-1004, 2 N.M. R. ANN. 695 (Michie 1996) (local rule for the Fifth Judicial District). States
identified as making some progress in developing comprehensive legislation include Florida, Kansas, Michigan,
Minnesota, Nevada, New York, Oregon, Utah, and Virginia. See HEwrrr, supra note 7, at 13.
135. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 1. § 14; N.M. CONST. art. H, § 14.
136. See, e.g., CAL. EvD. CODE § 752 (West 1995); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 221C, § 2 (West 1993).
137. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 14; CAL. EVID. CODE § 752 (West 1995).
138. See, e.g., CAL. EVD. CODE § 752 (West 1995).
139. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
140. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 68561-68564 (West Cum. Supp. 1996); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
221C, §§ 2-7 (West 1993).
141. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 68561-68564 (WestCum. Supp. 1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2B:8-1 (West
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statutory or constitutional rights, suffer from the same defect as the federal
Act.142
3. The Example of California
California's constitutional and statutory provisions are illustrative of the
deficiencies in both state and federal provisions for court interpreters. The
California Constitution provides that a "person unable to understand English who
is charged with a crime has a right to an interpreter throughout the
proceedings."' 4 3 Although the constitutional provision entitles a criminal
defendant to a proceedings interpreter, as well as a witness interpreter in the event
the defendant takes the stand, the language furnishes trial judges with no guidance
in determining whether a limited English-speaking defendant should be provided
with either type of interpreter. 1 The problem is compounded by the traditional
abuse of discretion standard appellate judges apply in determining whether the
trial judge complied with the requirements of the constitutional right. 45
The California Evidence Code requires trial judges to provide a witness
interpreter whenever "a witness is incapable of understanding the English
language or is incapable of expressing himself or herself in the English language
so as to be understood directly by counsel, court, and jury."'" As is the case
with California's constitutional provision, nothing in California's evidence code
provision purports to guide a trial judge in determining whether a limited
English-speaking witness can. or cannot be understood by counsel, the jury, or the
judge. Appellate courts, moreover, have not supplied any guidelines. Appellate
judges have been faithful to the legislative history which provides that under the
provision, as under pre-existing measures, "whether an interpreter should be
appointed is largely left within the discretion of the trial judge."' 47
Judges looking to California's equivalent of the federal Act will fare no better
in their quest for guidance. 48 Like its federal counterpart, the California statute
calls for the use of interpreters who have been certified as meeting prescribed
qualifications. "' The California statute, however, while containing extensive
provisions on training, identifying, and certifying interpreters, is absolutely silent
on the measures judges should use in determining whether a witness or litigant
should be assisted by a qualified interpreter.'"

1996); NJ. R. CT. 1:14, Pait I app. (1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-10-3 to 38-10-8 (Repl. Pamp. 1987); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2.43.020-2.43.030 (West Cum. Supp. 1996).
142. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
143.

CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 14.

all criminal
144. See id. The New Mexico Constitution suffers from the same defect. It provides that "[iin
prosecutions, the accused shall have the right ...to have the charge and testimony interpreted to him in a
II, § 14.
language he understands ...." N.M. CONST. art.
145. See, e.g., California v. Carreon, 198 Cal. Rptr. 843, 847 (Ct. App. 1984).
146. CAL. EVID. CODE § 752 (West 1995).
147. CAL. EvD. CODE § 752 cmt. (West 1995).
148. See CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 68561-68564 (West Cum. Supp. 1996).
149. See id.

150. The statutes of Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, and Washington are likewise silent on the
standards judges should employ in determining the linguistic incompetency of a party or witness. See MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 221C, §§ 2-7 (West 1993); N.J. R. CT. 2B:81; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-10-3 to 38-10-8
(Repl. Pamp. 1987); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2.43.020-2.43.030 (West Cum. Supp. 1996).
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Even recently enacted California statutes have the same defect. As of 1995,
the California Evidence Code requires judges to appoint an interpreter for parties
seeking protective orders in domestic violence and related proceedings if "the
No
party does not proficiently speak or understand the English language.""5
guidelines, however, are included to help the trial judge in determining whether
a party is or is not proficient in English. Although no cases have been brought
under this new evidence code provision, when such cases do arise there is no
reason to believe that appellate judges will depart from the traditional abuse of
discretion standard in reviewing rulings withholding an interpreter.
In sum, state statutory and constitutional law, as enacted and construed, have
failed to remedy the defects of the common law "abuse of discretion" approach
to the use of witness or proceedings interpreters. The absence of explicit
competency measures or guidelines, combined with the virtual unreviewability of
inferior court rulings, has left trial judges with the unenviable task of determining
the linguistic competency of limited English-speaking witnesses on an ad hoc and
linguistically unprincipled basis.
V. LAWYERS AND LINGUISTS
Obstacles to Development of a Language Assessment Instrument
Judges cannot be faulted for the dilemma they face. Currently, no tests exist
for determining whether a limited English-speaking witness should be assisted by
a witness interpreter. While linguists have developed measures for generally
assessing English proficiency' 52 (and, thus, the need for proceedings
interpreters), Valdts' work underscores the need for different assessment measures
when the question is whether a limited English-speaking witness can hold his or
her own, especially on cross-examination (and, thus, whether a witness interpreter
is necessary). 5 3 Linguists can help the bench and bar develop language
proficiency assessment tests that can identify those limited English-speaking
witnesses who should testify through an interpreter. Linguists also can help train
court personnel in the use of these tests. Because the increased use of limited
English-speaking witnesses is a certainty," the case for allocating resources to
develop reliable assessment measures does not require much elaboration.
The availability of resources is a serious consideration, however. Using
linguists to help develop the assessment measures is one matter. Making linguists
part of the process of identifying witnesses who need an interpreter is another.
Current demands on scarce judicial resources would make the use of linguists in
court impractical. So will any solution requiring trial judges to play the role of
trained linguists. Judges barely coping with crowded dockets would hardly
welcome the demands of mastering even limited aspects of a new field. The
same can be said of appellate judges. The widespread use of the traditional abuse
of discretion standard can be explained in part by the appellate bench and trial
judge's ignorance of linguistics and by resource constraints.
A.

(West 1995).
152. See Interview with Professor Guadalupe Valdds, supra note 119.
151. CAL. EviD. CODE § 755(a)

153. See supra Part III.

154. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying teXt.
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B.

Necessary Features of Any Language Proficiency Assessment Test
Although no language proficiency assessment tests currently exist for the court
system, following are some of the features such tests should possess. First, court
personnel must be able to administer the tests with minimal training. The goal
is not to teach court personnel to be linguists, but to train individuals to perform
a single, discrete linguistic task. There is no reason to continue to saddle trial
judges untrained in linguistics with the burden of assessing linguistic competency.
Judges, of course, must ultimately rule on whether a particular limited Englishspeaking witness is entitled to an interpreter. But judges can base their rulings
on the recommendations of the court personnel who administer the English
proficiency tests.
Second, the tests should not attempt to measure a subtle degree of English
proficiency. The challenge is not to duplicate the assessment measures linguists
can achieve through extensive testing in laboratory conditions. Although that
kind of precision is desirable, especially in detecting unfounded claims of English
incompetency, attaining a linguistical level of refinement in a courtroom setting
is impractical and, in most cases, probably unnecessary.
Third, it should be remembered that the goal is to give the parties, the parties'
counsel, the judge, and the jurors access to the evidence possessed by limited
English-speaking witnesses. That goal can be advanced by adopting procedural
rules favoring the use of an interpreter whenever the personnel administering the
assessment tests or the judge have lingering doubts about a witness's English
proficiency in a court setting.
Fourth, a witness should be referred for testing by court personnel whenever
the witness or a party requests a language proficiency assessment. Judges should
presume the need to appoint an interpreter, unless the personnel administering the
tests recommend against appointment.
Fifth, counsel must be afforded an opportunity to be heard before a judge's
final ruling. The party opposing the interpreter's appointment should have the
burden of persuading the judge on this issue.
Sixth, to prevent demands for interpreters from disrupting evidentiary hearings
and trials, local rules should be enacted to require parties to identify, prior to trial,
those witnesses who they believe may need interpreters. If it is impractical in
civil cases to identify these witnesses before the close of discovery, then
disclosure should be required by the time witness lists are exchanged. In criminal
cases many jurisdictions now require the defense and the prosecution to exchange
witness lists prior to the commencement of trial.'
When parties in a criminal
case provide their witness lists, they also should be required to disclose the
identities of those witnesses who may need an interpreter.'m

155. See, e.g., FED.R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(E), 16(b)(1)(C); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1054.1, 1054.3 (West CuM.
Supp. 1996); N.M. R. CRIM.P. 5-501(A)(5), 5-502(A)(3) (district courts); 6-504(C) (magistrate courts); 7-504(C)
(metropolitan courts).
156. Some jurisdictions exempt the criminal defendant from the witnesses who must be disclosed. See, e.g.,
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.3 (West Cum. Supp. 1996). The exemption does not pose serious problems. Limited
English-speaking defendants who are entitled to a proceedings interpreter are likely to be entitled to a witness
interpreter in the event they take the stand.
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C. Inherent Limitations with the Use of Interpreters
Communication is more than the use of words in a particular sequence.
Additional aspects are captured by the term "demeanor," which the law of
evidence uses to denote such nonverbal conduct as gestures, volume, and pauses
that are essential to understanding and evaluating verbal communications. Jurors,
for example, may consider not only the words spoken by witnesses but also how
they speak them in evaluating their credibility. 5 7 Nuance can affect the
meaning the speaker wishes to convey as well as the listeners' understanding of
the speaker's intent.
Thus, accurate interpretation requires more than just the correct rendition of a
question or answer in another language. Interpreters must try to convey nuance
and demeanor of the witness. But even highly trained interpreters may be unable
to capture these aspects of a witness' communications. Additionally, the use of
an interpreter is disruptive to techniques used by trial lawyers on cross-examination. 158
VI. CONCLUSION
The disadvantages and costs of the use of interpreters make their use
unattractive. But the alternative, erroneously withholding interpreters from limited
English-speaking witnesses, is even less attractive. The use of interpreters cannot
be avoided so long as witnesses with little or no command of English are called
to the stand because they possess information that is vital to the resolution of a
case. Trial judges will have to rule on whether a particular witness should be
assisted by an interpreter. Until reliable and easily applied language assessment
tests are developed and employed, trial judges will have no choice but to continue
to make ad hoc and untrained guesses about the linguistic competency of limited
English-speaking witnesses.

157. See, e.g., CAL. EVI. CODE § 780(a) (West 1995).
158. See supra Parts II.A.2 and H.B.

